opinion
Cooperation Without Dependency
Europe and Canada run critical systems on American technology. They can stay close allies of the U.S. and still make sure no single government can switch those systems off.
“A time of turbulence is a dangerous time, but its greatest danger is a temptation to deny reality.”
Peter Drucker, Managing in Turbulent Times
The institutional order built after 1945 is fraying. I did not expect to be writing in 2026 about digital infrastructure as a matter of national security, but the critical systems of Western democracies sit concentrated in foreign jurisdictions, and that has become a risk even between allies.
Digital sovereignty used to be a topic for lawyers. It is now a practical problem. States, and the societies they serve, can no longer ignore who controls their infrastructure.
The foundation: data sovereignty
At the core of digital sovereignty is data sovereignty: who can govern, access, and move data, even when the servers are elsewhere. Physical location is only part of the picture. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), for example, can apply to processing outside the EU when it is tied to an EU establishment, or to services offered to, or monitoring of, people in the EU. It does not simply follow where the data came from or a person’s citizenship.
How it got this way
American technological dominance was not accidental. Silicon Valley emerged from decades of U.S. defense spending, public research funding, and a regulatory environment that favored rapid experimentation and massive scale. Over time, U.S. companies came to define global standards: operating systems, cloud infrastructure, productivity software.
The world adopted American technology out of pragmatism. It worked, it was cheaper than domestic alternatives, and nobody else could match its scale. Building a European rival to Amazon Web Services (AWS) would have cost billions and still lagged behind on security, features, and the number of engineers who already knew how to use it. Subscribing was the rational choice.
Governments in Europe, Canada, and elsewhere trusted transatlantic partnerships to keep that arrangement reliable and legally aligned. The trust was never complete. The Snowden revelations in 2013 showed how far U.S. surveillance reached, and the EU’s top court struck down two data transfer deals over it. But the worry was always about who could read the data, never about whether the service would keep running. That second worry is new.
Allies change course
Trade tensions, strained intelligence-sharing arrangements, withdrawal from multilateral agreements, and volatile U.S. foreign policy have changed the landscape. 2026 began with U.S. military action in Venezuela and renewed talk of taking over Greenland, a territory of a NATO ally. Both show how quickly geopolitical assumptions can shift, even among long-standing partners.
The vulnerability takes two forms:
- Surveillance. Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) lets U.S. agencies compel American communication and cloud providers to hand over the communications of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the U.S., without an individual warrant. Under the CLOUD Act, providers subject to U.S. jurisdiction can be ordered to disclose data they control even when it is stored abroad, although conflicts with foreign law can still arise. Together, these laws make it hard to protect sensitive data held by American providers.
- Access denial. The United States could order American technology companies to stop serving specific institutions, or in an extreme case whole countries. This is not hypothetical. In February 2025 the Trump administration sanctioned the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and by May he had reportedly lost access to his Microsoft email. Microsoft says it never stopped serving the court itself, but in October 2025 the ICC confirmed it is replacing Microsoft Office with openDesk, a European open source suite. Cutting off a whole allied country would hurt American companies too. A court, a regulator, or a ministry losing its accounts overnight is the more likely risk, and it is enough.
So infrastructure now has to survive two kinds of failure: a broken data center, and an ally that changes course.
Dependency is not collaboration
Cooperation between democracies remains essential, but dependency is not the same as collaboration. Strategic autonomy, the ability to keep essential systems running on your own terms, requires systems that function even when partners reverse course. Intelligence agencies must operate when diplomatic relations sour. Healthcare must continue when cloud providers receive conflicting directives. Fundamental rights should not hinge on another nation’s political stability.
Recent lessons
COVID-19 showed what happens when critical resources concentrate in a single jurisdiction. Western nations discovered how much of their medical supply chain ran through Chinese factories. Masks and protective equipment became scarce almost overnight, and ventilator makers could not get parts fast enough.
Russia did the same with gas, turning pipelines that once symbolized shared prosperity into a way to apply pressure.
In 2025, Portugal and Canada publicly reconsidered their F-35 plans. Reports that American fighter jets might contain a remote “killswitch” circulated widely, and officials denied any such switch exists. The concern behind the reports was real, though. Washington controls the jet’s software updates, mission data, and spare parts. Cut those off and a fleet slowly stops flying. Cloud services work the same way.
Amazon, Microsoft, and Google hold roughly 70% of Europe’s cloud infrastructure market, while European providers account for about 15%. Hospitals, ministries, and public services across Europe run on these platforms, which leaves much of that work open to both risks above.
The cost of inaction
Supply chains for masks can be rebuilt in months. Energy suppliers can be diversified in years. Military procurement can redirect over a decade. Digital infrastructure is different. A virtual machine can move in an afternoon, but systems built on one vendor’s proprietary services, identity platform, and office software take years to untangle, and that layer gets thicker every year.
Laws help, but only so far. The EU’s top court struck down Privacy Shield, the old EU-U.S. data transfer deal, in 2020 because U.S. surveillance law did not meet EU standards. Its replacement, the 2023 Data Privacy Framework, rests on a U.S. executive order that a future president can revoke, and it is already being challenged in court. A ruling can protect your rights on paper. It cannot keep a server running when its owner is ordered to switch it off.
Why this is hard
Europe’s efforts are fragmented. Gaia-X is an industry association writing shared rules for cloud and data services, and it counts the big American cloud providers among its members. IPCEI-CIS, a separate state-funded cloud project, is backed by only seven member states, alongside a patchwork of national programmes. Canada faces different constraints: trade agreements that bar it from requiring private companies to store data in the country (government data is exempt), difficulty retaining skilled immigrants, and deep economic integration with the U.S.
The industry’s own answer is the “sovereign cloud”: AWS’s European Sovereign Cloud, and Microsoft and Google technology run by European partners such as Bleu, Delos, and S3NS. These keep data and staff in Europe, which helps against demands for data. They help less against access denial. The software is still licensed from an American company, and a U.S. order could stop the updates.
The core problem is timing. Building resilient infrastructure requires sustained multi-year investment while global competitors offer immediate, cheaper solutions. The cost of sovereignty shows up now, in higher prices and fewer features. The cost of dependency stays theoretical until the day it doesn’t. For the ICC’s prosecutor, that day came in 2025.
What builders can do
Cooperation without dependency does not mean leaving American providers. It means making leaving possible. The EU’s Data Act already points that way: since September 2025 cloud providers must let customers switch to a competitor, and from January 2027 they cannot charge for it. Email shows what the end state looks like: thousands of independent operators, one shared standard, and no single company that can switch it off.
If you build software, you make these choices every week. A few questions tie them to the two risks:
- Who holds the encryption keys? If the provider does, a U.S. court order reaches your data. For anything sensitive, keep the keys outside the provider.
- Could you run this somewhere else next month? Proprietary managed services make the answer no. Where the cost is small, prefer open standards and portable building blocks like Postgres, S3-compatible storage, and containers.
- Have you tried? An export path you have never tested probably does not work. Move a real workload to another provider once in a while.
- Does it federate? Email and Mastodon keep working when one server disappears. Choose tools built that way.
None of this means abandoning American tools. It means making sure you could leave.